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Kim Il Sung’s language purification policy, calling for the elimination of all 
loanwords, was born out of the juche (self-reliance) ideology.  Promoting language purity 
was a way to unite the North Korean people in a feeling of cultural superiority over the 
traitors in the South whose relationship with the US, the North’s enemy, showed no signs 
of weakening and whose relationship with Japan, the former colonizer, was being 
reestablished.     
What might have been the nonlinguistic function of Kim Il Sung’s language 
purification policy – calling for the elimination of all Chinese loanwords, which 
constitute approximately 50% of the Korean language?  Could it have been a 
performance to promote nationalism, rather than a plan to purify the Korean language, 
and what might have been the significance of such a performance?  In relation to this 
main line of inquiry, how are Kim’s language policies similar to the language policies of 
other communist states, particularly the USSR and China?  What was the significance of 
events in South Korea in the 1960s that might have influenced Kim to make these 
pronouncements on language policy?  How are Kim’s language policies holding up 
today?   
I examine two speeches by Kim Il Sung in 1964 and 1966 that contain the 
extreme language policies.  In the 1980s, Kim’s successor, Kim Jong Il, approved the 
reinstatement of many loanwords that had been removed from the language under   
 iv 
the purification policy.  The fact that Kim Il Sung’s loyal son recognized the 
impracticality of applying his father’s policies suggests that one aim of these policies, if 
not their exclusive goal, was something other than their actual application.   
Kim Il Sung’s focus on the purging of loanwords was a reflection of his desire for 
North Korea to prove its cultural purity and its cultural superiority over the South.  I 
argue that the language policy speeches of the 1960s served as a platform for Kim Il Sung 
to carry the ideology of juche to his people and to unify them in the feeling that North 
Korea’s language and culture was superior to, what he regarded as, the tarnished 
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Actions in North Korea are often reactions to events in the South of the peninsula.  
Every year, there is an escalation of threats from North Korea as the South Korean 
military commences its annual drills with the US military.  Last March, the North reacted 
by shooting missiles into the sea, “probably to show its displeasure over war games being 
conducted by rival South Korea and the United States” (Gutierrez).  The North’s firing of 
missiles into the sea is seen as a direct reaction to the purpose of the war games in the 
South: to prepare for possible combat with the North.  The North’s use of arms as a 
reaction mirrors the provoking events and demonstrates its military strength.  Language 
policy formation in North Korea also served to assert strength over the South, although 
not militarily.  In this paper, I demonstrate how North Korean language policy was 
formed as a means by which Kim Il Sung could demonstrate to his people the North’s 
cultural superiority over the South. 
Kim Il Sung’s language purification policy, calling for the elimination of all 
loanwords, was born out of the juche (self-reliance) ideology that he first established in 
1955 to distance North Korea from the Soviet Union.  By the beginning of the Sino-
Soviet split in 1960, in the name of juche, Kim had also distanced North Korea from 
China and was establishing North Korea as a self-reliant, communist state.  One of the 
first steps he took to establish juche was to purge the government of factions that stood 
between him and his full, unchallenged rule of North Korea.  In a symbolically parallel 
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fashion, Kim insisted on purging all foreign loanwords in Korean, which characterized 
Kim Il Sung’s language purification policy.   
Kim Il Sung’s purification policy, as I will explain, is an extreme endeavor that, if 
accomplished, would have resulted in a language with a lexicon of which at least half 
would have been different from the Korean used in South Korea.  I argue that Kim’s 
language purification policy was created as a vehicle to carry the ideology of juche to the 
people.  Promoting language purity was a way to unite the North Korean people in a 
feeling of cultural superiority over the traitors in the South whose relationship with the 
US, the North’s enemy, showed no signs of weakening and whose relationship with 
Japan, the former colonizer, was being reestablished.     
North Korean language policy was first established in 1945 directly following the 
division of the peninsula.  These first policies dealt with eradicating illiteracy and 
included a move to eliminate Chinese characters.  This paper analyzes, more specifically, 
the language purification policy established in the 1960s by Kim Il Sung.  This policy 
called for the elimination of loanwords in Korean and the replacement of such loanwords 
with pure Korean words.   
Examination of the literature surrounding North Korean language policy reveals, 
unsurprisingly, that one of its goals was to control the hearts and minds of the North 
Korean people, thereby protecting the regime from a revolution.  Akiyasu Kumatani 
explains that particular words that had the potential of inspiring public uprisings were 
removed from North Korean dictionaries (98).1  New dictionaries did not print Chinese 
                                                
 
 
1 According to Werner Sasse, eleven dictionaries in sixteen volumes have been 




loanwords but, rather, the newly coined Korean words with the exception of “those 
adopted words which represent feudalism, ethical concepts, religious concepts, and old-
fashioned customs” that were “eliminated . . . by strong social control forbidding the use 
of these adopted words” (Kumatani 98).2  This move was clearly designed to control not 
only the language but also, in turn, the actions of the people.   
The North’s emphasis on Korean language education and illiteracy eradication 
supports Kumatani’s notion of language policy as a form of thought control.  Young-Hie 
Han describes the goal of the North Korean regime behind Korean language instruction 
as a means of providing “people with a better tool by which they may be urged to adhere 
to communist doctrine, oral and written and to maintain the downright loyalty and respect 
                                                                                                                                            
1 According to Werner Sasse, eleven dictionaries in sixteen volumes have been 
published in North Korea.  “Publication of a Korean Encyclopedia has also started, but no 
more than two volumes out of a projected 30 have appeared to my knowledge” (69).  
Among these published “dictionaries” are encyclopedias, which were published for a 
variety of fields and “they carry an increasing number of newly coined words the later 
their publication date is” (69). 
 
2 Not only were many words discarded from the dictionary if they had a 
feudalistic meaning, but also definitions of certain words were omitted if they were 
considered invalid in “modern Korean [Munhwa-ŏ] [문화어 Cultured Language]” 
(Kumatani 105).  For example, in the dictionary of 1960 – 1962, “the meaning of 
[yŏkchŏk] ‘a rebel’ is given as (1) a person who rebels against his country or people, (2) 
(in feudal society) the name given by a ruling class to ‘the person who is against a ruler’; 
whereas, the 1968 dictionary omitted the second meaning” (105).  Another example of a 
word whose definition was customized to fit the goals of the regime is the word 
chayujuŭi.  In English, this word means ‘liberalism’.  The 1968 dictionary in North Korea 
defined the word as, “the tendency or attitude to hate organizations or regulations in 
social political life and to act according to one’s own will” (105).  However, in a South 
Korean dictionary published in 1982, the word is defined as “an –ism meaning to 
recognize the dignity of individuals and to let them develop their own character of their 
own accord” (105).  Kumatani’s research clearly shows the thought control aspect of Kim 
Il Sung’s language policy.  It is also interesting that the definition changes in the 
examples above occurred with Chinese loanwords that were, apparently, not replaced by 
pure Korean words.  This is evidence that not all Chinese loanwords were replaced, at 




for the people for the ruler” (216).   
The literature provides convincing evidence to support the idea that North Korean 
language policy contains certain elements that were created out of a desire to control the 
thoughts and actions of the public.  Hyun-Bok Lee’s research, which I will address later, 
even shows that the public’s speech was altered, at least for a time, as a result of the 
policy (72).  However, I disagree that this notion explains the full goal of the impractical 
purification policy, which was the policy that Kim Il Sung most emphasized.  The policy 
called for the removal of loanwords.  This policy was unsustainable and, according to Jae 
Sun Lee, in the 1980s, 50% of the newly coined words were thrown out and by 1992, 
only 24% of the coined words remained in the dictionary (131). 
Ross King posits,  
Since the abortive new Korean orthography [more on this later] and the 
purge of Kim Tu Bong3 [circa 1958], language policy in North Korea has 
become an important part of the DPRK’s socialist revolution.  North 
Korea has indeed worked systematically to mold the Korean language into 
a pure, nationalist weapon of communism. (140)   
 
Although I agree with King’s statement that North Korean language policy was rooted in 
nationalism, I argue that its formation was also a reaction to events occurring in South 
Korea. 
What might have been the nonlinguistic function of Kim Il Sung’s language 
purification policy – calling for the elimination of all Chinese loanwords, which 
constitute approximately 50% of the Korean language?  Could it have been a 
performance and a tool to promote juche while establishing linguistic purity and cultural 
                                                
 
 
3 Kim Tu Bong, a North Korean linguist, created six new letters for the Korean 
script in 1958 and disappeared soon thereafter. 
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superiority over South Korea, rather than a practical, long-term plan to purify the Korean 
language, and what might have been the significance of such a performance?  In relation 
to this main line of inquiry, how are Kim Il Sung’s language policies similar to the 
language policies of other communist states, particularly the USSR and China?  What 
was the significance of events in South Korea in the 1960s that might have influenced 
Kim Il Sung to make these pronouncements on language policy?  How are Kim Il Sung’s 
language policies holding up today?   
In order to address these questions, I will look closely at two speeches by “The 
Great Leader”, the first leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter, 
DPRK).  These two speeches, “The Talks with Linguists” by Kim Il Sung in 1964 and 
1966, contain the extreme language policies for which there would be some attempt at 
implementation, at least until the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994.  In these speeches, Kim Il 
Sung outlined the actions that should be taken to purify and develop the Korean 
language.  The policy of purification was perhaps the most critical to Kim Il Sung.  It is 
the policy that he seemed to stress most emphatically in his speeches and the policy upon 
which I base the majority of this paper. 
Kim Il Sung’s language policy, as proposed to linguists, calls for an overhaul of 
the language.  Kim Il Sung’s policy of language purification is particularly noteworthy as 
it calls for the elimination of loanwords, including Chinese loanwords, which make up 
roughly half of Korean language vocabulary.  Kim Il Sung’s premise was that purifying 
Korean from the contamination of Chinese, Japanese, English, and other loanwords was a 
necessary step in building the Communist state.  In his speeches, Kim Il Sung argues that 
a Korean language free of loanwords was a pure Korean that could then develop 
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independent of outside influence.  
Although North Korea translated Stallin’s article “Marxism and Various Problems 
of Linguistics” (Ko 15), indicating an interest in Soviet language policies, an analysis of 
the Soviet Union’s ideas of language in society reveals that Kim Il Sung’s 1960s 
language policy was quite different from that of his communist neighbor.  While the 
USSR and China’s language policy seemed to focus primarily on establishing a unified 
writing system and a national language in order to unify the people and increase literacy, 
Kim was attempting to completely revamp the Korean language, and planned to do so at 
an unprecedented rate. 
The implementation of Kim Il Sung’s language purification policy in the 1960s 
paralleled a time in South Korea that has been referred to as the “decade of development” 
in the title of Yunshik Chang’s book.  Much of this development was a result of US aid to 
South Korea, which started in 1952 and continued for the next three decades.  This aid 
symbolized not only the South’s relationship with the US, but also its willingness to look 
beyond its borders for assistance.  
In 1960, at the beginning of this “decade of development” in South Korea, 
President Rhee was removed from power.  Given Rhee’s anticommunist position and the 
fact that South Koreans overthrew him, the North Korean regime must have been feeling 
optimistic about the future.  The North’s optimism was short lived as the succeeding 
government in the South was overthrown in a military coup in 1961. North Korea, fearing 
that the US was behind the coup and that the new South Korean regime would pose 
greater threats, drastically increased its security (Kihl 48).   
Following the military coup, Pak Chung-hee became the president and 
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emphasized, above all else, economic growth.  At this time “the U.S. government began 
to implement a plan that called for greater interaction with the Republic of Korea on 
economic development” (“South Korea: From Aid”).  Interaction between South Korea 
and Japan also increased with the normalization treaty of 1965.  
In the midst of these events – increased interaction between the US and South 
Korea, and the South’s normalization of relations with Japan – Kim Il Sung presented his 
language purification policy.  However, Kim Il Sung’s language policies later proved 
unsustainable, and his son and successor, Kim Jong Il, approved the reinstatement of 
many loanwords that had been removed from the language under the purification policy.  
The fact that Kim Il Sung’s loyal son and successor recognized the impracticality of 
applying his father’s policies suggests that one aim of these policies, if not their exclusive 
goal, was something other than their actual application.  This raises questions regarding 
the nonlinguistic functions at play in his speeches. 
This paper argues that Kim’s pronouncement of his outlandish language policiy 
was built out of the juche ideology as a means of promoting nationalism within North 
Korea and as a performance to prove the nation’s cultural strength.  Kim Il Sung’s focus 
on the purging of loanwords from Chinese, Japanese, and English was a reflection of his 
desire for North Korea to prove not only its cultural purity, but also its cultural 
superiority over the South.  I argue that the language policy speeches of the 1960s served 
as a platform for Kim Il Sung to carry the ideology of juche to his people and to unify 
them in the feeling that North Korea’s language and culture was superior to, what he 




BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KOREAN LANGUAGE ON THE PENINSULA 
 
In order to grasp the significance of language policy in North Korea, it is essential 
to understand the situation of the Korean language prior to the division and formation of 
North and South Korea.  Japan ruled the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945.  The 
perception that the Japanese were out to destroy Korean culture and the Korean language 
during these 35 years is shared by Koreans on both sides of the peninsula and gave fuel to 
future language policies in North Korea. 
From 1910 to 1920, Japan’s assimilation efforts focused on Korean newspaper 
censorship and resulted in a newspaper blackout.4  Protests by Koreans in “The March 
First Movement” in 19195 resulted in “Cultural Law,” which allowed Korean newspapers  
                                                
 
 
4 During 1910-1920, all privately owned newspapers were closed down 
(Robinson Korea’s Twentieth-century 41).  Only one Korean newspaper remained, Daily 
News (Maeil Sinbo).  Two specific laws controlled the content of this newspaper: 
“Korea’s Newspaper Law” of 1907, and the “Publication Law” of 1909.  Under these 
laws, the surviving papers were subject to prepublication censorship of articles that 
“defamed the imperial households of Korea and Japan,” “jeopardized public peace,” 
“disturbed morals”, etc.  The laws also required publishers to obtain a permits that could 
easily be suspended for a variety of reasons (Shin and Robinson 43).   
 
5 The March First Movement in 1919 was characterized by protests against the 
colonial government and was the first recognized act of resistance against the Japanese 
government by Koreans.  The changes that resulted from the movement were, initially, 
positive.  Cultural Rule was the new law that produced these positive changes.  Under 
Cultural Rule, “The press blackout was broken, as the GGK (Government General of 
Korea) relaxed its censorship standards and offered permits for vernacular newspapers 
and journals with political content” (Robinson Korea’s Twentieth-century 50).  Robinson 
stated, “The permission to publish Korean vernacular newspapers after 1920 stimulated a 
  
9 
to reemerge.  Censorship began to build again and reached its peak in 1924 (Robinson 
Cultural Nationalism 151).6  Although the late 1920s saw the birth of Korean language 
broadcasting, “It was clear that the GGK decided to provide a Korean-language station in 
tandem with the move to intensify cultural assimilation in the colony after 1931” 
(Robinson “Broadcasting in Korea” 366).  By 1938, the colonial government demanded 
exclusive use of Japanese in schools and government buildings.7  In 1941, all radio 
programs that dealt with the Korean language were banned.  Korean language 
broadcasting ended altogether in 1944. 
Japan’s assimilation efforts that focused solely on language seemed to be most 
emphasized in the final years of the occupation.  By 1941, Korean language education 
was no longer permitted in schools (Rhee 91).8  Under Japanese occupation, Korean 
language usage in public9 was not only prohibited at two separate times but, toward the 
                                                                                                                                            
Korean nationalist movement to create a unified grammar and orthography” 
(“Broadcasting in Korea” 368).   
 
6 This period lasted until 1927 and came as a result of the Peace Preservation 
Law, which was enforced by the High Police.  Robinson points out that the Koreans 
began to refer to newspapers as “brick wall newspapers” (Korea’s Twentieth-century 59).  
Often times, so many words were removed from articles and replaced with dashes by 
censors that the newspaper page began to resemble a brick wall. 
 
7 The colonial government took steps to more fully assimilate Koreans to 
Japanese culture by restricting “the use of Korean language in school and government 
offices” while also making an effort to “rewrite Korean history and spread Japanese 
cultural values more generally” (Robinson “Broadcasting in Korea” 366).   
 
8 “Class hours allocated for Japanese language classes were conspicuously more 
than for Korean.  For example, in 1922, six [sic] graders would have two hours of Korean 
and nine hours of Japanese” (Rhee 91).  In 1938, “The Korean class hours per week 
dropped from six to four hours in elementary schools, and in 1941, Korean language 
teaching at all school languages was abolished” (91). 
 
9 Although it was not required to speak Japanese in the home, toward the end of 
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end of the Japanese colonization period, Koreans were also encouraged, though not 
legally required, to “Japanize” their names.  In order to be successful in the Japanese 
governed Korea, Koreans needed Japanese names.  Those who chose to keep their 
Korean names “could not enter schools, get jobs, or obtain ration cards” (Kang 117).  
Many Koreans made an effort to keep some aspect of their former name as part of their 
new Japanese name.  For example, Kim ‘gold’, was converted into Kanekuni ‘gold 
country’, Kanezawa ‘gold pond’, Kaneshiro ‘gold castle’, or Kaneda ‘gold rice field’ 
(Kang 120).  
This period inspired a sense of pride for the Korean language and a drive to 
protect it particularly amongst groups like the Korean Language Society (조선어학회) 
who worked tirelessly to develop and standardize Korean throughout the Japanese 
occupation.10  The Korean Language Society, a group that had originally formed in 1908, 
rose up and made concerted efforts to standardize the written language, Han’gŭl11 
(referred to as ‘Chosŏn’gŭl’  in North Korea).  The Korean language society also “pushed 
forward with its plans for a massive monolingual dictionary until 1942, when the nearly 
completed manuscript was confiscated by the Japanese authorities.  Many of the scholars 
were arrested and imprisoned, and two even died in prison” (King 112).  Chin Kim states 
that these scholars were regarded to some extent as national heroes following Korea’s 
                                                                                                                                            
the 1920s in Seoul, Japanese usage was not uncommon in the homes of the upper and 
middle classes (Song qtd. in Myers 29). 
 
10 The aforementioned birth of Korean-language broadcasting in the 1920s “added 
an additional weapon to the movement to organize and standardize the Korean vernacular 
language” (“Broadcasting in Korea” 368). 
 
11 The Korean Language Society’s publication, the 1933 ‘A Guide for the 
Unification of Korean Spelling’ changed phonetic orthography to a morphological 
syllable division-based spelling system (Rhee 93) 
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independence from Japan (“Divergence in Language” 250).  
The Korean language standardization movement was a form of nationalist 
resistance under the Japanese occupation (1910-1945) until the arrests of Korean linguists 
in 1942, and the language issue reemerged with liberation from Japan in 1945.  However, 
soon after liberation, “with the creation of separate republics in 1948, the Korean 
language debate was doomed to develop in a divided land” (King 109).  After the 
division of the peninsula in 1945, both North and South Korea started to focus on the 
language issue and began developing language policies independent of one another.   
North Korea’s efforts focused on illiteracy eradication following the division of 
the peninsula (Kumatani 92).  A major initiative to strengthen literacy at this time was 
eliminating Chinese characters from the Korean script.  Chinese characters were kept 
only for scientific terms and names of places and people.  As previously mentioned, the 
North professed that it had attained 100% illiteracy four years after independence from 
the Japanese.  
Regardless of whether or not the North’s claim of having achieved complete 
illiteracy eradication was true, eliminating illiteracy would have been a top priority for 
Kim Il Sung given his communist ideals.  “An illiterate person is outside politics and he 
has to be taught his ABC.  Without this there can be no politics; without that there are 
rumours, gossip, fairy-tales and prejudices, but not politics” (Lenin).  Increasing literacy 
and spreading the Great Leader’s policies went hand in hand. 
However, eliminating Chinese characters and using solely Chosŏn’gŭl resulted in 
homonyms that had the potential of causing confusion.  Different Chinese characters, 
containing different meanings, can have the same pronunciation.  When written in the 
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Korean alphabet, two characters with the same pronunciation are written identically 
although their meanings are different.  The North addressed this issue by initiating the 
purification movement, which coincided with Chinese character elimination by 
eliminating Chinese loanwords (Moon 35).  Although a committee was formed in 1949 
(Taylyukyenkwuso qtd. in Moon 35) to further this movement, Kumatani notes that no 
“concrete results” (96) were reported.   
This period leading up to the Korean War was also characterized by projects 
related to Korean orthography and dictionary compilation.  Neither of these movements 
seemed to result in a language gap with South Korea.  Indeed, the entries in the newly 
published dictionaries in the North were not dissimilar to the entries in South Korean 
dictionaries of the same time period (Cha Cay-Un qtd. in Moon 38).  Moon states this 
was the case because the “systematic language engineering in the Munhwa[-ŏ] [문화어 
“cultured language”]12 period (1964~present)” (38) had not yet begun. 
The Korean War (1950-1953) temporarily halted language development plans in 
North Korea.  Following the ceasefire, language policies that had the potential of 
resulting in a language gap between the North and South began to take shape.  One such 
change in 1954 was that of a revised language prescription, Chosŏnŏ ch’ŏljapŏp (조선어 
철자법 Korean Orthography), which was related to standardizing spelling, pronunciation, 
grammar, and vocabulary to reflect the language of the proletariat. 
This post-Korean War period in North Korea also saw the creation of more 
dictionaries.  These new dictionaries included new words that were related to 
                                                
 
 
12 This is the name that North Korea has given to its Korean dialect. 
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communism.  Semantic changes in words were also introduced.  For example, the 
definition for “capitalist” became “the ringleader of the ruling class in a bourgeois 
society, the owner of capital exploiting and betraying workers’ labour and the enemy of 
democracy” (Concise Korean Dictionary qtd. in Moon 42). 
After the Korean War, the purification movement was also reinstituted.  The 
movement focused on the purification of difficult Sino-Korean and Japanese words, 
many of those being technical and academic words (Moon 44).  Moon explains that the 
purification movement at this time was not approached systematically, as it came to be in 
1964 (45).  In other words, Kim Il Sung was not solely directing the purification efforts; 
the linguists had held responsibility and initiated much of the vocabulary reform.   
These dictionary changes and purification efforts are signs that Kim Il Sung was 
moving toward juche, an ideology that the Great Leader first introduced in 1955 in his 
speech “Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological 
Work.”  Victor Cha states the four tenets of juche: “(1) man is the master of his fate; (2) 
the master of the Revolution is the people; (3) the Revolution must be pursued in a self-
reliant manner; (4) the key to Revolution is loyalty to the supreme leader, or Suryŏng, 
Kim Il Sung” (37).  In North Korean rhetoric, the last two points seem to be those that 
were most emphasized.   
Loyalty to the leader was, and still is, the most important of the four elements of 
juche.  Cha explains,  
Juche’s writings taught that the Great Leader (Suryŏng) Kim Il-sung was 
the brain, the party was the nerves, and the people were the arms, legs, 
muscle and bone of the state.  Two messages of obedience emerged: (1) 
without the brain, the rest does not function; therefore, there must be 
complete loyalty; and (2) independent thinking was not needed, since this 
was handled by the brain.  The only critical thinking that was allowed was 
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self-criticism based on guilt for not serving the leader well. (43) 
 
Not only was independent thinking not needed, it was not tolerated if it was contrary to 
the ideas of the “brain”, Kim Il Sung.   
 His first speech on juche in 1955 was given as a reaction to the recent animosity 
that Kim Il Sung had developed for the Soviet Union.13  Implementation of the juche 
ideology would allow North Korea to maintain a distance from the Soviet Union.  
Implementing the ideas of juche would also prove effective in distancing North Korea 
from China.14  Following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, adherence to juche principles 
allowed North Korea to take a neutral stance while still managing to maintain somewhat 
positive relations with both sides.15   
                                                
 
 
13 In the 1950s the Soviet Union refused to provide North Korea with assistance, 
which was seen as betrayal by the DPRK (Puzanof April 1957 and Puzanof May 1957 
qtd. in Suh 2013, p. 70).  Khrushchev’s rise to power also negatively affected North 
Korea-Soviet relations.  The Soviet Union made efforts to interfere with North Korea’s 
domestic affairs.  These events influenced the North to do things “our way” (Suh 70), a 
main principle of the juche ideology.      
 
14 Armstrong explains how the DPRK distanced itself from China in 1960 through 
criticism of China’s ideology of “dependence.”  “The KWP [Workers’ Party of Korea] 
Central Committee in October 1960 criticized obsequious attitudes toward foreign 
countries and mindless imitation of things foreign, a practice it labeled sadaejuŭi, or 
‘flunkeyism,’ as the term was officially translated in later North Korean texts…Both pro-
Soivet and pro-Chinese behavior was condemned as ‘flunkeyism,’ but for Korean and 
Chinese readers, it was obvious that sadaejuŭi referred to Korea’s traditional reverence 
for China and Chinese culture – the term sadae or ‘serving the great’ originated with the 
ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, and in traditional Korea referred to Korea’s 
subordinate relationship to China.  Sadaejuŭi was, in fact, the antithesis of Juche, 
dependence rather than self-reliance.  The use of this term implied that Juche would not 
be directed only against the Soviet Union, which was the primary target of Kim’s original 
1955 Juche speech, but against any dependence on or imitation of China as well” (122).    
 
15 As Armstrong discusses, in July 1961, the DPRK successfully signed treaties 
with both the USSR and China.  “On July 6, 1961, the DPRK signed a Treaty of 
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Within North Korea, Kim Il Sung’s commitment to juche and its principles 
resulted in the elimination of those who posed a threat to Kim’s goal of being the “brain” 
of the state.  Perhaps the most notable were the purges of particular groups both within 
and without the government.  One such purge occurred in August 1956 when a group 
sought to replace Kim Il Sung.  The rebels accused Kim Il Sung of adhering to “outdated 
Stalinist methods” (91).  Despite these accusations, Kim Il Sung was sustained through a 
majority vote.  Kim Il Sung then purged the rebels from the government.   
 Although Kim Il Sung said he would reinstate the rebel group after China and the 
USSR demanded that he do so, he did not keep his word.  Instead, Kim continued his 
purges until all of the regime’s opposition groups had been expelled.  Kim Il Sung 
attained an unchallenged position in which he was able to “replace the Soviet-sponsored 
‘dependent Stalinism’ of 1945-1956 with his own brand of ‘national (or, if one prefers 
chuch’e) Stalinism’” (Lankov 91).  The Great Leader was taking full advantage of his 
authority as the “brain.” 
 Kim Il Sung did not stop after he had purged rebels in the government.  He also 
understood the threat of education to his juche ideology.  Lankov describes the purges of 
“seeds of dissent” (96) at Kim Il Sung University as “particularly thorough” (96).   
 The establishment of the juche ideology in North Korea was characterized by 
purges.  In order to establish this new order, Kim Il Sung removed anything and 
everything that threatened the full implementation of juche.  This purging, or as Kim Il 
Sung calls it “purification”, was also a key element of North Korea’s language policy in 
                                                                                                                                            
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the USSR in Moscow, and then, 
five days later, signed an almost identical treaty with China in Beijing” (Chung 1978 qtd. 
in Armstrong 2013, 124).  “These two alliance treaties reflected North Korea’s masterful 
manipulation of Beijing and Moscow rather than trilateral cooperation” (124).   
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the 1960s.   
During the 1960s, Kim Il Sung suddenly became much more concerned with 
language issues.  In 1964 and 1966, Kim Il Sung officially outlined his language 
purification plan for the communist state, through two speeches given to North Korean 
linguists.  This paper will shed more light on why Kim Il Sung chose this time in history 
to emphasize the elimination of loanwords over the other aspects of North Korean 
language policy (i.e., the eradication of illiteracy, the elimination of Chinese characters in 
publications, and the publishing of new dictionaries).
 KIM IL SUNG’S LANGUAGE POLICY AND THE GOAL OF PURIFICATION 
 
Kim Il Sung’s Talks with Linguists, as they were titled, occurred twice: first in 
1964 and again in 1966.  North Korea’s language policy has stemmed mostly from these 
two “talks.”  In these speeches, Kim Il Sung outlined the actions that he wished to take in 
order to purify and develop the Korean language.  I will explore the policies through the 
context of these two speeches.   
On January 3, 1964, Kim Il Sung gave his first speech on language policy titled, 
“Some Problems Related to the Development of the Korean Language.”  In this first 
speech, Kim Il Sung spends time introducing what he perceives as problematic issues 
with the Korean language.  He addresses letter reform and states, “our letters do have 
certain shortcomings… Our syllabics are square… Reforming them would also have 
advantages: it would make them easier to read and would enable us to type quickly and 
facilitate the technicalization of letters” (Kim “Some Problems” 4).16  However, he makes 
it clear that letter reform should not take place before reunification.  He also briefly 
mentions an issue he sees with word spacing, or the lack thereof.  “Words ought to be 
spaced.  In our writing now each word does not have a fixed form.  Therefore our writing 
looks like an unbroken string of syllabics.  So, at a glance, it is less appealing to the eye
                                                
 
 
16 “우리의 글에 일정한 결함이 있으니만큼… 고치면 좋은 점도 있습니다.  




than Chinese or European writing” (Kim “Some Problems” 10).17  However, neither of 
these issues seems to be the focus of his 1964 speech. 
Most of Kim Il Sung’s 1964 speech is spent on, what he labels, the “most 
important question which calls for our attention” (Kim “Some Problems” 5).  Kim is 
referring to the issue of Chinese loanwords “which have flooded our language” (5).18  He 
ends with a brief discussion on reforming the way Korean is taught in schools.   
The purpose of the 1964 speech seems to be two fold: to introduce the problems 
with the Korean language and to inspire a sense of pride in the language.  He meets the 
second goal by praising the Korean language.  “We should be justly proud of our spoken 
and written language and should love it” (Kim “Some Problems” 5).19  However, he 
continues by admitting that the language is not perfect and actions should be taken to 
improve it further. 
On May 14, 1966, Kim Il Sung gave his second speech titled “On Correctly 
Preserving the National Characteristics of the Korean Language.”  In this speech, Kim Il 
Sung continues to focus on the elimination of Chinese words and loanwords altogether.  
He also briefly mentions a call to replace Chinese place names with pure Korean names.  
The issue of letter remodeling is briefly touched upon but, again, Kim Il Sung states that 
                                                
 
 
17 “단어는 띄어써야 합니다.  지금 우리 나라 글에서는 단어들이 하나하나 
고정된 형태를 이루지 못하고있습니다.  그러니 글자들을 죽 늘어놓은것 같아서 
한문이나 구라파나라들의 글보다 얼핏 보아서는 눈에 잘 들어오지 않습니다” (Kim 
“Chosŏnŏrŭl palchŏnsik’iki” 252). 
 
18 “가장 중요한 문제는 우리 말에 많이 섞여있는 한자어에 관한 문제입니다” 
(Kim “Chosŏnŏrŭl palchŏnsik’iki” 250). 
 
19 “우리는 자기의 말과 글을 응당 자랑해야 하며 사랑하여야 합니다” (Kim 
“Chosŏnŏrŭl palchŏnsik’iki” 250).  
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this is an issue to be addressed fully only after reunification.  The word spacing issue also 
reemerges.  Kim suggests that the future improvement of word spacing will facilitate 
reading (“On Correctly Preserving” 296).  As is the case with the 1964 speech, Kim’s 
1966 speech gives less attention to the issues of letter remodeling and word spacing than 
to the language purification policy.   
In this second speech to linguists, Kim Il Sung lays out plans on how to purify the 
language of loanwords.  He discusses the number of words that should be replaced by 
pure Korean words and how to integrate them into society.  Newspapers, dictionaries, 
textbooks, and new teaching methods would all play a role in popularizing the new and 
pure Korean words, which would carry the same meaning as the former Sino-Korean 
word.  Kim Il Sung also states that children should correct the incorrect speech of adults 
since the words will be taught to pupils in primary school.    
As I address certain aspects of these speeches, it is important to keep in mind that 
Kim Il Sung was respected not only because he was the leader of North Korea but also 
because of his purported involvement as an activist during the Japanese occupation.  As 
AnnMarie Saunders states, “Kim Il Sung’s [purported] participation in this guerrilla 
warfare and resistance to the Japanese form the foundation of his legitimacy as leader of 
the DPRK” (2).  Kim Il Sung was viewed by North Koreans as an active resister to the 
colonizers’ efforts to assimilate Koreans to Japanese ways.20   
 As mentioned previously, the main issue that Kim Il Sung addressed in his Talks 
                                                
 
 
20 Interestingly, Kim was actually outside of the country for a large part of the 
occupation period, a fact he likely did not publicize.  Given this reality, it is quite ironic 
that he is the one addressing issues of language purity, and apparently, viewed as 
qualified to do so. 
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with Linguists is that of loanwords.  The existence of Chinese, Japanese, and Russian 
loanwords in the Korean language was a matter of great concern for Kim Il Sung.  He 
spoke negatively about the effect of these words on the Korean language stating that they 
have “adulterated” the language.  He was adamant in emphasizing that the use of 
loanwords would ultimately result in the destruction of the Korean language. 
 
Chinese Loanwords as an Obstacle to Purification 
Kim Il Sung focused primarily on Chinese loanwords, as those were, and still are, 
the most prevalent element in the Korean language.  One of the first actions taken to 
purify the Korean language occurred even before Kim Il Sung’s speeches.  The removal 
of Chinese characters from textbooks began directly after liberation from Japan and 
works using only Korean letters began to be published (Kumatani 92).  
The North became obsessed with purifying Korean of Chinese loanwords after 
Kim Il Sung’s speeches on language policy.  This complete reformation of the vocabulary 
system resulted in a noticeable language gap between the two countries, which was met 
with shock by South Korean scholars during South – North talks (1971, 1972) (Kumatani 
97).  At the talks between the North and South, the South noticed a significant language 
barrier between the two sides.  Hyun-Bok Lee describes the situation. 
Some words and expressions were totally unintelligible and some 
apparently familiar words were found to have entirely different semantic 
connotations.  At first, South Koreans assumed that such differences might 
be purely dialectal, but they realized before long that the language 
differences between South and North Korea were much more than 
dialectal…dialectal differences in Korea have never been so great as to 
affect mutual understanding between speakers of different dialectal 
background. (72) 
 
This quote is evidence that the purification policy was in full swing, at least until this 
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point in history and at least among the government elites, a few years after it was 
established.   
 To strengthen his resolve to rid the language of loanwords, Kim Il Sung cited 
South Korea’s language situation and claimed that the situation in the south was dire.  He 
referred to the South’s Korean as a “polyglot language” (“On Correctly Preserving” 283) 
and described it as “a debasement of Korean with English, Japanese and words of 
Chinese origin” (“On Correctly Preserving” 283).21  “In fact, the situation is such that if 
the words of Chinese, Japanese and English origin were eliminated from the language 
used in South Korea, there would be nothing left of our own language except [such 
particles as] –ul and –rul” (“On Correctly Preserving” 284).22 It is true that Chinese 
characters still abounded in formal publications in the South at this time while they were 
nearly nonexistent in the North.  However, when taking into account all South Korean 
publications of this time, this statement by Kim was a clear exaggeration of the general 
state of the language in the South, an accurate depiction of which was secondary to the 
goal of rallying the linguists around the purification policy. 
In regard to loanwords, Kim Il Sung leaves no room for considering what may be 
their rightful place in the Korean language.  At no point does Kim Il Sung admit that the 
acquisition of loanwords is a natural phenomenon that has occurred in every language in 
the world.  It seems he would definitely disagree with Chin Kim, who said, “neither 
                                                
 
 
21 “조선말에 영어외 일본말과 한자말이 뒤섞인 범벅이말도 들어오고” (Kim 
“Chosŏnŏŭi minjokchŏk” 256).  
 
22 “사실 남조선에서 쓰고있는 말에서 한자말과 일본말, 영어를 빼버리면 




Chinese characters nor Sino-Korean vocabulary is the Chinese language.  This is to say 
that they are loanwords, not foreign words” (“Underlying Causes” 973).  Kim goes on to 
say “It is no less patriotic or moral to adopt loanwords than to import science and 
technology from abroad.  In what sense is it desirable to borrow science and technology 
but undesirable to borrow scientific and technical terminology accompanying them?” 
(“Underlying Causes” 973).  Kim’s point suggests that Kim Il Sung’s resistance to 
loanwords, at least from a descriptive linguistic standpoint, is nonsensible and provides 
further evidence that his purification policy had a nonlinguistic function. 
Kim Il Sung refused to acknowledge the natural phenomenon of loanwords.  He 
held to his opinion that words from outside of Korea had no place in the North.  Because 
he believed the use of loanwords was unpatriotic, he rallied the linguists by connecting 
nationalism and ownership to language.  He goes so far as to say, “We should teach 
everyone to think that those who use Chinese ideographic words and borrowed words are 
devoid of national pride, and those who speak their own language well are learned men 
with a high national pride” (“On Correctly Preserving” 292).23  According to Kim Il 
Sung, in order to be considered patriotic, one must be able to use the Korean language 
exclusively.24   
He states that if you are a Korean with a national conscience, you will not be 
                                                
 
 
23 “우리는 모든 사람들이 한자말이나 외래어를 쓰는 사람은 민족적긍지가 
없는 사람이고 자기 나라 말을 잘하는 사람이 유식하고 민족적자부심이 높은 
사람이라고 생각하도록 하여야 합니다” (Kim “Chosŏnŏŭi minjokchŏk” 261). 
 
24 Considering the fact that Chinese language skills had previously been a sign of 
civility in Korea, this negative stance toward the Chinese language is particularly 
surprising.   
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happy to see the language die away.  On this point, he frequently criticizes Japan and 
South Korea.  He states, “Language is a major indication of national character” (Kim “On 
Correctly Preserving” 284).25  Kim Il Sung makes the point that since the Japanese use 
American words in science, their science is not their own (“On Correctly Preserving” 
284).  He references his conversation with a representative of the Japan Communist 
Party,  
In Japan, he said, science is making progress, but it can hardly be boasted 
of as Japan’s own; it is characteristically American.  And science itself is 
capitalized on as a moneymaking means by businessmen.  In other words, 
he said, today’s Japanese science is not true science.  So the Japanese 
entirely copy American ways in the development of science, with the 
result that English terms flood in to adulterate Japanese, I was told. (“On 
Correctly Preserving” 284)26 
 
In this way, Kim Il Sung attempts to belittle Japan by connecting language with 
ownership.  In other words, even though Japan seemed technologically superior to North 
Korea, it was not really superior.  Since its technology had English names, its technology 
was America’s rather than its own.  
 
Replacing Chinese Loanwords to Meet the Goal of Purification 
To embark on the path to purification, Kim Il Sung proposed, “Technical terms 
and the like should also be printed in newspapers two or three times a week; some 15 
                                                
 
25 “언어는 민족의 중요한 징표의 하나인데…” (Kim “Chosŏnŏŭi minjokchŏk” 
256).  
 
26 “그의 말에 의하면 일본에서는 과학이 발전하고 있기는 하나 자기 민족의 
것은 거의 없고 미국화되고 있으며 과학자체가 장사군들의 돈벌이에 
리용되고있다고 합니다. 말하자면 오늘의 일본 과학은 참다운 과학이 못 된다는 
것입니다. 일본사람들이 과학발전에서 이렇게 미국본만 따다보니 영어가 많이 




newly proposed words at a time should be carried in the papers, so that the masses can 
write critical essays and submit questions about them” (“On Correctly Preserving” 289).27   
According to this quote, Kim Il Sung planned to introduce 30-45 new words per week 
and seemed to think that this was a reasonable rate of change.  He followed up his 
proposal by saying, “If the words handed down over scores of hundreds of years are 
changed overnight, people will not accept them.  Moreover, those who changed them will 
scarcely remember all of them and so will be unable to use them all” (“On Correctly 
Preserving” 289).28  Kim Il Sung seems to contradict himself here.  Previous to this 
statement, Kim Il Sung had mentioned that some Chinese words would stay in the 
language if they have been in the language long enough.  However, here he suggests that 
the words to be changed include the ones that are very old.  Kim Il Sung proposed the 
replacement of thousands upon thousands of words (“On Correctly Preserving” 290).  
Not only did he want to replace old Chinese words, but he also wanted commonly used 
Chinese words to be replaced.  In fact, his plan was to start by replacing those Chinese 
words that are most commonly used.  He states that a dictionary should be compiled to 
popularize the most common 7 – 8,000 of these newly coined pure Korean words (“On 
Correctly Preserving” 290).   
Yon-sook Hong (qtd. in Kim “Divergence in Language” 253) gives the following 
                                                
 
 
27 “학술용어 같은것도 신문에 한주일에 두세번쯤 내야 하며 다듬을 말을 
한번에 열댓개씩 신문에 내여 대중이 평론도 쓰게 하고 질문도 내게 하여야 합니다” 
(Kim “Chosŏnŏŭi minjokchŏk” 259). 
 
28 “몇십몇백년동안 내려온 말을 하루아침에 다 고친다면 사람들이 
받아들이지 않을것은 물론, 고친 사람들 자신도 모두 기억하지 못하여 다 쓰지 




examples of coined words in North Korea. 









[kyun kkangkŭri chukiki] 
‘utter extermination of germs’ 
 
[chiksŭng pihaengi]29 
‘vertically ascending aircraft’ 
 
As the examples show, combining basic, pure Korean words is the method used to 
replace Chinese words with pure Korean words.  The newly created words may be 
simpler but are formed by combining basic words making them longer and less efficient.  
Kim (“Divergence in Language”) states that changing words this way “is like asking 
English speakers to use such coined phrases as under-sea boat instead of sub-marine, 
long-distance-speaker instead of telephone, etc.” (249).  It is absurd to believe that the 
public would alter their language in a way that is less efficient when languages naturally 
develop in a way that makes them more efficient.  However, I would argue that the 
effectiveness of the policy’s implementation was less important than the aim of 
promoting nationalism amongst the people by uniting them through the idea of linguistic 
purity and cultural superiority over the South.   
In his other speech to the North Korean linguists on January 3, 1964, Kim Il Sung 
stated, “Beginning just after liberation, we have maintained that easy – not difficult – 
words should be used; nevertheless, there are still many people who use words that are 
                                                
 
 
29 Ironically, this coined word is composed entirely of Chinese roots.   
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over the heads of the masses (“Some Problems” 12).”30  Calling for the use of easy, not 
difficult, words after liberation coincides with Kim Il Sung’s focus on eliminating 
illiteracy that dominated early language policy in the DPRK.  Moreover, higher level 
vocabulary in Korean tends to include more Chinese words than lower level or easy 
words.  Therefore, continuing to emphasize the use of easy words over difficult words, 
while it may continue to further the literacy effort, was also another way of instructing 
the public to not use Chinese words.   
Kim Il Sung again sealed the argument for his language policies with the idea of 
nationalism.  He asserts that using Chinese words does not show that somebody is 
learned, but does show a lack of national pride (Kim “On Correctly Preserving” 292). He 
continues to condemn those who use Chinese loanwords as a means of flaunting their 
education or ability to use high-level vocabulary.  Kim makes the point that it is the 
nobler man who speaks and writes in a manner that is comprehensible to all people (Kim 
“Some Problems” 12). 
 It is quite clear that Kim Il Sung’s main policy was to replace Chinese loanwords 
with pure Korean words.  “When our native word and a word borrowed from Chinese 
ideographs mean one and the same thing, we must adopt the former and discard the latter, 
removing it from the dictionary” (“On Correctly Preserving” 285).31  One would assume 
                                                
 
 
30 “우리는 해방직후부터 힘든 말을 쓰지 말고 쉬운 말을 쓸것을 
주장하여왔으나 아직도 대중이 알아듣지 못할 어려운 말을 쓰는 사람들이 
많습니다” (Kim “Chosŏnŏrŭl palchŏnsik’iki” 253). 
 
31 “고유어와 한자말이 뜻이 꼭같을 때에는 고유어를 쓰고 한자말을 쓰지 




that a removal of Chinese words from dictionaries would reflect Kim Il Sung’s belief that 
Chinese words had no place in society.  However, this was not the case.  Kim continued 
to require students to learn Hanja in school. 
Kim Il Sung knew the importance and the prevalence of Chinese loanwords in the 
South.  In order to understand South Korean newspapers and other publications, it was 
essential to understand Chinese characters.  Thus, in spite of the goals of eliminating 
Chinese, starting in 1968, North Korea set the number of Chinese characters that students 
should learn from middle school to university (S.K.C. qtd. in Kumatani 93).  The North’s 
goal was for students to learn a total of 3,000 characters by the time they graduated from 
college.  Insup Taylor and Martin Taylor break down this goal in terms of how many 
Chinese characters are learned during each period of schooling.  According to their 
research, the breakdown is “1,500 characters in the six years of secondary school…500 
additional Han[j]a in two years of technical school; and 1,000 additional Han[j]a in four 
years of university” (241).   
The establishment of these learning goals does not mean that the North was 
allowing Chinese characters to be printed in their publications, aside from in the Chinese 
character (Hanja) textbooks themselves.  Rather, these education goals would provide 
North Korean students with the necessary skills to understand the texts in the South.  In 
fact, Kim Il Sung’s goal was to destroy all non-Hanja textbooks containing Chinese 
characters.  He said, “If textbooks include them, they will look like south Korean ones” 
(“On Correctly Preserving” 294).32  This statement shows that Kim Il Sung’s elimination 
                                                
 
 
32 “교과서들에 한자를 넣으면 남조선모양으로 됩니다” (Kim “Chosŏnŏŭi 
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of textbooks with Chinese characters was rooted in a desire to differentiate the North 
from the South in addition to the expressed goal of ridding the land of Hanja.    
Jae Jung Song claims that North Korean students actually learn more Chinese 
characters in their schooling years than students in South Korea.  However, since Chinese 
characters are not found in printed materials in the North, South Koreans may be more 
proficient in them than their North Korean counterparts (144).  Again, Kim Il Sung’s 
emphasis on learning Hanja seems to contradict the perceived hatred for Chinese words 
and suggests that his purification policy was not, in fact, linguistically based.   
In his 1966 speech, Kim Il Sung also called for places or villages with Chinese 
names to be replaced with pure Korean names.  “It sounds more tasteful to do so than to 
call them by Chinese ideographs pronounced in Korean fashion” (“On Correctly 
Preserving” 285).33  It is clear from looking at a current map of North Korea that these 
changes did not occur.  Major cities and provinces in North Korea maintain their original 
Sino-Korean names.  A prominent example of a city that has maintained its Sino-Korean 
name is the capital city, “P’yŏngyang” (평양),34 while, perhaps ironically, South Korea’s 
capital, Seoul, did discard its original Sino-Korean name, “Hanch’ŏng” (한청).   
                                                                                                                                            
minjokchŏk” 262). 
 
33 “우리 말로 부르는것이 한자말로 부르는것보다 더 고상합니다” (Kim 
“Chosŏnŏŭi minjokchŏk” 257). 
 
34 On the topic of naming policies, recent news from North Korea proves that 
naming policies are still being developed and adhered to.  The North has declared that 
nobody is permitted to have the name Kim Jong Un.  This tradition has been in place 
since Kim Il Sung, the first leader of North Korea.  Kim Jong Il was also a proponent of 
this policy.  If somebody already has the name Kim Jong Un and has had it since birth, a 
name change is required.  The New York Times article stated, “It is unclear how many 
people had to change their names to comply with the new rules, but in South Korea, 
Jong-un is a common name for both men and women” (Cho). 
 OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES’ LANGUAGE POLICIES 
 
Kim Il Sung’s speeches on language policy allude to the idea that language 
policies and communism run hand in hand.  In his words, “A true patriot is a communist.  
Only communists truly love their mother tongue and endeavor to develop it” (“On 
Correctly Preserving” 284).35 This statement by Kim Il Sung raises the question, how, if 
at all, are Kim’s language policies similar to the language policies of other communist 
states, particularly the USSR and China?   
It has been speculated that North Korean language policy was influenced by 
Soviet language policy.  According to one scholar, the North “even translated Stalin’s 
‘Marxism and Various Problems of Linguistics’” (Ko 15).  However, a comparison of 
Kim Il Sung’s speeches to North Korean linguists and Joseph Stalin’s article on language 
in society only furthers the notion that Kim Il Sung was in a league of his own in terms of 
his language purification policy.  
Joseph Stalin, in reference to the changes in the Russian language over “this long 
span of time” said “The Russian vocabulary has in this period been greatly replenished; a 
large number of obsolete words have dropped out of the vocabulary; the meaning of a 
great many words has changed, the grammatical system has improved” (7-8).  This idea 
                                                
 
 
35 “참다운 애국자는 공산주의자입니다.  오직 공산주의자들만이 자기 나라 





of language replenishment relates to Kim Il Sung’s policy of language purification.  The 
difference, it seems, is that vocabulary changes in Russian occurred when words were 
“obsolete.”  This approach is more passive and natural than that used in the DPRK.  Kim 
Il Sung’s approach was active and unnatural as it called for an unconditional forced 
replacement of Chinese words. Kim’s plan was, essentially, to force the formation of a 
new language.  Chinese loanwords account for about half of the Korean language and his 
goal was to replace them by publishing vocabulary lists of 15 newly coined words 2-3 
times per week in North Korean newspapers. 
China’s language policies dealt with three main goals, none of which relate to 
Kim Il Sung’s language purification policy, although there are parallels with other 
aspects of North Korean language policy.  According to Defu Wan, these include 
“selecting a national language, reforming its writing system (simplification, 
standardization and Romanization), and promoting it in the educational system.  Script 
reform was used as a way to facilitate promotion of the national language and mass 
literacy” (66).  The Chinese policy of selecting a national language is similar to Kim Il 
Sung’s goal of strengthening nationalism, which is prevalent in his speeches.  China’s 
promotion of the language in the education system is also seen in North Korea, as 
evidenced in Kim Il Sung’s textbook reform efforts.  For the Chinese, the goal to 
eliminate illiteracy was also highly emphasized, as it was in North Korea.  
China believed that literacy and power ran hand in hand.  Indeed, the most 
powerful armies in the world, those of Europe and that of Japan, had literate soldiers.  
“Dr. Arthur H. Smith (qtd. in De Francis, 1950, 45) argued, ‘the leaders of the New 
China had learned that one chief element in the amazing efficiency of the Japanese 
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soldier lies in the fact that he can read’” (qtd. in Wan 74).  Yet, China had an illiteracy 
rate of 90%. 
Latinization was another policy that came about in China in the 1930s under Mao 
Zedong.36  The latinization policy was formed out of a desire to improve literacy 
throughout China.  In 1936, Mao declared,  
we believe latinization is a good instrument with which to overcome 
illiteracy.  Chinese characters are so difficult to learn that even the best 
system of rudimentary characters, or simplified teaching, does not equip 
the people with a really efficient and rich vocabulary.  Sooner or later, we 
believe, we will have to abandon characters altogether if we are to create a 
new social culture in which the masses fully participate. (De Francis qtd. 
in Wan 76)  
 
In Mao’s China, latinization also allowed for uniform pronunciation within the 
regional dialects of Chinese, which fostered a certain sense of nationalism within the 
country and regions.  Mao created policies that unified the populace, either through 
latinization efforts or a push for the establishment of a single language.   The desire to 
inspire nationalism through language policy is reflected in North Korean language policy 
as well.  And as a policy built on the backbone of the juche ideology, which calls for self-
reliance in all areas, North Korea’s language policy also could have the effect of unifying 
the people. But it is Kim’s purification policy that sets the DPRK’s language policy apart 
from that of its communist neighbors.  This policy, if successful, would essentially result 
in an entirely new language in approximately 200 years.37  It is important to consider 
                                                
 
 
36 Indeed, the Korean people would not have benefitted from latinization like the 
Chinese since the Korean script was already phonetic.  
 
37 Kim Il Sung’s plan to replace 15 Chinese words 2-3 times a week with newly 
coined Korean words would result in 1,560-2,340 words a year.  If there are 500,000 
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events that were occurring in the region at the time to more fully understand why Kim Il 





















                                                                                                                                            
words in the Korean language and half of those are Chinese words, it would take 
approximately 160-213 years to replace all of the Chinese loanwords.   
 EVENTS IN SOUTH KOREA THAT PROMPTED KIM IL SUNG’S  
LANGUAGE POLICY FORMATION 
 
The Sino-Soviet split that began in 1960 had the effect of further strengthening 
Kim Il Sung’s move toward juche.  The trilateral axis of communism between China, the 
USSR, and North Korea was rapidly diminishing and North Korea had the choice to side 
with the Soviets, who had given them valuable economic aid, or China, with whom they 
had shared a close relationship for centuries.  Charles Armstrong notes that instead of 
choosing one side, the DPRK chose both sides.  North Korea first signed a Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the USSR.  A mere five days later, 
a similar treaty was signed with China.  “These two alliance treaties reflected North 
Korea’s masterful manipulation of Beijing and Moscow rather than trilateral cooperation” 
(Armstrong 124).  By establishing alliances with both sides, North Korea was able to 
have its cake and eat it too – the DPRK could reap the benefits of an alliance with both 
the USSR and China simultaneously while never declaring loyalty to one over the other.   
These treaties placed North Korea in a position of security in the face of a 
growing military in South Korea.   The next step to ensure security was for the North to 
build up its own military.  Armstrong states, “By the middle of the decade, Juche took on 
new meaning as a policy of military self-reliance, or as a DPRK slogan 
of the times put it, ‘turning the whole country into an armed camp’” (129).  The sudden 
military buildup reflected a sense of anxiety within the North’s regime.   
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Armstrong lays out a number of issues that influenced the military buildup in 
North Korea:  
In 1963, Park was elected president, which gave him at least the 
appearance of greater legitimacy than the head of an unelected junta, and 
the US president Kennedy renewed the American commitment to defense 
of the South.  The ROK government was newly stable, firmly 
anticommunist, more formidable militarily than before, and even showed 
signs of economic growth after several years of stagnation.  By contrast, 
North Korea’s relations with the Soviet Union were openly tense, and its 
relations with China were less warm than they appeared.  Foreign 
assistance was decreasing, and the domestic economy was slipping. (131)   
 
Although the South did not overtake the North economically until the 1970s, the 
South’s economy was at least stable and steadily growing by 1963 while the North’s was, 
as Armstrong points out, “slipping” (131).38  The stability in the South Korean economy 
was a result of that country’s strengthening relationship with the US and Japan.  I want to 
look more closely at these strengthening relationships and their influence on North 
Korean language policy.  What was significant regarding the events of the 1960s in South 
Korea that might have caused Kim to make these pronouncements on language policy?   
                                                
 
 
38 North Korea, at the time of the division and throughout the 1950s, was 
economically much stronger than South Korea.  The North was historically more 
industrial whereas the South was more agricultural.  As hard as it may be to believe 
looking at the two countries today, there was a time when the South actually relied on the 
North for certain products.  As Cumings points out, during the occupation period, the 
Japanese had built chemical plants in the North.  Consequently, the South depended on 
the North for essential fertilizers in the 1950s (324).  At the beginning of the 1960s the 
situation was not much different.  According to Cumings “North Korea’s industrial 
economy had overcome the wartime destruction and was steaming far ahead of the 
South” (351-352).  The industry developed in the North during the Japanese occupation 
allowed the North to maintain an economically superior position over the South for many 
years.  The North was confident that it could maintain this position and created economic 
development plans to ensure its continued industrial success (see Bruce Cumings 434 for 
more information).  The North’s economic prosperity was slowed significantly when the 




South Korea’s rapid development that began in the 1960s and eventually pushed 
its economy ahead of the North’s in the 1970s was preceded by economic aid to South 
Korea.39  This aid was the highest in the 1950s but still continued throughout the 1960s.  
Tae-Gyun Park explains the US’s motives for continuing aid to South Korea,  
the improvement of economic conditions in North Korea was one of the 
factors highlighting the need for economic growth in South Korea.  North 
Korea achieved a remarkable economic recovery and growth in the 1950s, 
and the United States continued to monitor its development…Because the 
Korean peninsula remained divided, and each side maintained a system 
very different from the other, American policy makers regarded South 
Korea in particular as ‘a display window of democracy.’ (102)   
 
The US felt the imperative to help South Korea become a beacon of democracy amidst its 
communist neighbors.  Although the South did not become the clear economic leader on 
the peninsula until the 1970s, it was clearly an achievement that the US had envisioned 
since the establishment of North and South Korea in 1945. 
US aid to South Korea in the 1960s was divided into two plans, “The First Five-
Year Plan (1962-1966) and the Second Five-Year Plan (1967-1971) of Economic 
Development” (Kihl 50), and successfully implemented.  “The key points of the new 
proposals were to reduce military grants, to reduce the size of the South Korean army, 
and to increase economic development aid” (Park 106).  Until this time, US aid to South 
                                                
 
 
39 In comparison to other Asian countries after 1960-62, “acceleration was 
greatest in (South) Korea” (Chang, 1980, 18).  South Korea’s rapid development during 
the 1960s is referred to as “decade of development” and later became a model throughout 
the world.  It was unimaginable that a country like South Korea could develop at such a 
rate.  Park Chung-hee was at the helm as the South’s president during the “decade of 
development” and despite his many shortcomings, many Koreans credit him for South 
Korea’s economic success.  Park was probusiness and under his leadership, from 1961-
1979, the “Korean model of development had its heyday” (Cumings 1997, 79).  This is 
exemplified by Hyundai, the Korean chaebŏl, and its major success in the 1960s. 
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Korea was primarily focused on military support.  As previously stated, it was crucial to 
the US that South Korea be an example of democracy and its benefits to the rest of the 
world.  Therefore, not surprisingly, the US decided, “Korean plans should be the focus of 
American influence, and the basic determinant of the U.S. aid program” (106).  
In addition to the two five-year economic plans, South Korea received additional 
military aid from the US for its involvement in Vietnam.  In Korea’s Place in the Sun, 
Bruce Cumings cites Macdonald and Woo in explaining the financial reward that the 
South received from the US for its participation in the war.   
The operative document was the so-called Brown memorandum of March 
4, 1966, under which about $1 billion in American payments went to 
Korea in the period 1965-70.40  Scholars estimated that this arrangement 
annually accounted for between 7 and 8 percent of Korea’s GDP in the 
period 1966-69 and for as much as nearly 19 percent of its total foreign 
earnings. (321)   
 
The US was eager not only for South Korea to be an example of economic success in the 
region but also to join it in the fight against the spread of communism throughout the 
world.  By his second speech to linguists on May 14, 1966, Kim Il Sung was likely aware 
of the Brown memorandum of March 4, 1966, and undoubtedly aware of the South’s 
participation in Vietnam and its joint resolve with the US to destroy communism.  
Although reunification was still a popular topic in this period, Kihl points out, 
“No headway in nation building was made, however, during the 1954-1970 years.  The 
policy toward reunification in this period was largely a matter of rhetoric and empty 
gesture, expressing a pietistic attitude toward the sacred national task” (50). While 
                                                
 
 




reunification discussions seemed to take the back seat, the South’s economy grew and its 
ties with the United States continued to be strong.   
North Korea was undoubtedly aware of America’s support of the South and the 
South’s acceptance of their support.  In the midst of the first phase of economic 
development aid from the US to South Korea, “the First Five-Year Plan” (1962-1966), 
Kim Il Sung gave his 1964 language policy speech to linguists.  To illustrate the necessity 
to coin new words as well as replace Chinese ideographs simultaneously, Kim Il Sung 
said “If you write sangjon [“mulberry field”], the young people may confuse it with the 
word sangjon [“master”] which you use when you condemn the puppets for licking the 
boots of their Yankee masters” (“Some Problems” 6).41  The North, or at least Kim Il 
Sung, viewed the South as a puppet regime controlled by the Yankees.  This expression 
exemplifies Kim’s discontent with the South’s continued relationship with and 
dependence on the US.  The South’s relationships with the North’s enemies, the US and 
Japan, were not only a betrayal but were counter to the juche ideology, which was in full 
swing in North Korea.  
Then there was the matter of North Korea’s other archrival, Japan, and its 
relationship to South Korea. The United States was in favor of reconnecting South Korea 
and Japan, something the North would have vehemently opposed.  Cumings explains, 
“From 1947 onward, as we have seen, a cardinal element of U.S. foreign policy was to 
bring Japanese economic influence back into Korea” (318).  The US, therefore, largely 
                                                
 
 
41 “<<상전>>이라고 쓰면 아마 젊은 사람들은 괴뢰들이 미국놈을 자기들의 
주인으로 모신다고 욕할 때 쓰는 <<상전>>과 헛갈릴수 있습니다” (Kim 




coordinated the normalization between the two nations.  This fact only fueled the rhetoric 
in the North regarding South Korea as a puppet nation.42  
South Korea’s normalization with Japan was a monumental event given the 
history of Japan and the Korean peninsula.  The Japanese occupation of Korea was a 
period still fresh in the minds of the older generation and many Koreans of the younger 
generation were also up in arms over the potential normalization with the former 
colonizers.43  Although normalization was unwelcomed by many Koreans, it cannot be 
argued that Korea did not benefit economically from the controversial policy.  “In the 
normalization the ROK received from Japan, a direct grant of $300 million and loans of 
$200 million in 1965 dollars, and private firms put in another $300 million in 
investment” (Cumings 321).  The South Korean regime’s newfound political ties with 
Japan fueled North Korea’s hatred for its southern neighbor as well as for the US, which 
was believed, even by many South Koreans, to have coordinated the normalization policy 
out of favoritism for Japan rather than for South Korea (Mobius 246). 
It was the Japanese that had carried out countless atrocities on the Korean 
                                                
 
 
42 Even among South Koreans, there were those who were skeptical of the US’s 
involvement in the normalization process.   As the US was putting pressure on South 
Korea to normalize relations with Japan, suspicion arose regarding the US’s loyalty to the 
South.  Many South Koreans believed that the US actually favored Japan and the 
normalization treaty would serve Japan’s interest by allowing it to further strengthen its 
position as a leader in the region (Mobius 244-246). 
 
43 The spring of 1964 saw large student demonstrations protesting the 
reinstatement of martial law (Cumings 360).  “The normalization of Korean relations 
with Japan, which did so much for the Korean economy was thus accomplished only after 
massive demonstrations and political disorders lasting several years.  In August 1965 the 
ruling party voted 110 to nothing to ratify the treaty, the opposition members having 
boycotted the National Assembly” (Macdonald qtd. in Cumings 360). 
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peninsula with the goal of assimilating Koreans to the Japanese way of life.  Not the least 
of which was linguistic imperialism.  “Before liberation, the Japanese imperialists tried to 
stamp out our language and letters.  Proclaiming Japanese the ‘national language,’ they 
prohibited the use of Korean and forced us to use Japanese” (Kim “Some Problems” 2).44 
Given this statement by Kim in 1964, South Korea’s normalization with Japan in 1965 
was likely seen by the North as a betrayal, and particularly a betrayal of Kim Il Sung, 
whose persona was based in part on his claim to have been a guerilla fighter and activist 
during the Japanese occupation.  Indeed, Kim’s 1966 speech suggests a stronger stance 
against Japanese loanwords than his 1964 speech.  In 1964, with reference to Japanese 
apple names, Kim states, “If a species is from Japan, it should be given a Japanese name, 
but if it is from our own country, it should have a Korean name” (Kim “Some Problems” 
9).45  His tone is noticeably different in 1966 when addressing the presence of Japanese 
loanwords in Korean, “Some comrades now say that because the present names of apples, 
rice and the like have become familiar to us, it will be difficult to change them.  But we 
must change them boldly without hesitation” (Kim “On Correctly Preserving” 286).46  In 
his 1966 speech, Kim seems to allow no exception to eliminating Japanese loanwords.  
                                                
 
 
44 “해방전에 일본제국주의자들은 우리 말과 글을 없애려고 하였습니다. 
그들은 일본말을 <<국어>>라고 하면서 조선말을 못쓰게 하고 일본말을 쓰게 
하였습니다” (Kim “Chosŏnŏrŭl palchŏnsik’iki” 248). 
  
45 “만일 그 종자가 일본것이라면 일본이름을 붙일것이고 우리 




46 “지금 어떤 둥부들은 사과나 벼 같은것은 이때까지 부른던 이름에 
버릇되였기때문에 그것은 다근 이름으로 고치기 힘들다고 하는데 주저하지 말고 
대담하게 고쳐야 합니다” (Kim “Chosŏnŏŭi minjokchŏk” 258). 
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This change reflects Kim Il Sung’s demonstration of commitment to Korean culture and 
the Korean language directly following South Korea’s normalization with Japan.   
South Korea in the early 1960s began to look outward.  At the same time, in the 
Northern half of the peninsula, Kim Il Sung was focused on his self-reliant ideology, 
juche.  The language policies put forth by the “The Great Leader”, particularly the 
purification policy, with its goal of purifying the Korean language of outside influence, 
reflect North Korea’s ever-increasing resolve to be an independent state governed by 
juche and untarnished by the Yankees or those who agree with their corrupt ways, 
specifically South Korea and Japan. 
South Korea’s relationships with the US and Japan, two rich and powerful 
nations, showed no signs of weakening as evidenced by the aid packages.  The US’s 
continued aid and other events leading up to the early 1960s in South Korea – Park’s 
election, US president Kennedy’s renewed commitment to defend South Korea, the 
ROK’s political stability and signs of economic growth – occurred when the North’s 
foreign aid was decreasing and its economy was suffering (Armstrong 131).  In 
Armstrong’s words, “North Korea was ahead of the South only in terms of its political 
stability, or rather the near-absolute control of Kim Il Sung and his partisan group” 
(Armstrong 131).  The North’s only clear advantages over the South had been reduced to 
its political stability.   
In the face of this reality, and in the spirit of juche, Kim Il Sung developed a new 
strategy in his competition with South Korea.  Kim Il Sung could quite easily make a 
case that the South, through its nonadherence to juche ideology – strengthening relations 
with a former colonizer and the Yankees – was losing its culture, language, and overall 
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Korean-ness.  It was the perfect time for Kim Il Sung to establish cultural dominance 
over South Korea through officially establishing his language policy.  Through proposing 
language policies based on juche in the form of linguistic purity, Kim Il Sung could prove 
that North Korea was indeed a nation so culturally strong that not even its language was 
affected by outside influence.  Kim was less concerned with the language purification 
policy’s linguistic function than with its nationalistic function of rallying the people 

















 LANGUAGE POLICY AS A PERFORMANCE OF CULTURAL SUPERIORITY 
 
Kim Il Sung’s speeches on language policy were more a performance with the 
aim of proving cultural superiority over the South than a long-term plan to purify the 
Korean language.  It is hard to believe that any of the Korean linguists in Kim Il Sung’s 
audience sincerely believed that the proposed language policies would be successful.  
The purification policy of eliminating loanwords, particularly Chinese loanwords – 50% 
of the Korean language - was illogical.  If successful, the “pure” Korean would look more 
like a different language than a purified form of Korean. 
North Korea’s language policies did not achieve the success that Kim Il Sung had 
envisioned in his speeches.  The policy regarding the elimination of Chinese place names 
was clearly unsuccessful as North Korea maintains many Chinese place names today.  
The other policy that came up short was the one that Kim Il Sung most emphatically 
stressed: the purification policy. 
Lexical purism, which was initiated in earnest after Kim Il Sung’s two 
speeches in 1964 and 1966, produced a series of collections of revised 
words in 1977, 1978, 1982 and finally in 1986.  What was noticeable in 
the final collection of revised words was that almost half of revised words, 
which had reached 50,000 by 1986, was removed (Choy qtd. in Moon 
104).  Some Sino-Korean and other loanwords, which had been replaced 
with native words or had been revised into nativised words, were 
reinstated.  Both revised and original words were recognized in some 
cases, while some revised words were further modified. (p.104)   
 
In other words, half of the Sino-Korean words that had been revised since Kim Il Sung’s 
speeches were removed from the language between the 1982 and 1986 publications of 
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collections of revised words.   
Not only had 25,000 revised words been removed from the list of 50,000 but also 
Sino-Korean words that had been thrown out under Kim Il Sung were being reinstated.  
In justification of this policy amendment, Kim Jong Il, the second leader of the DPRK 
said, “there are no small number of ambiguous and awkward native circumlocutions as a 
result of unnecessary replacement of nativised Sino-Korean words” (Choy qtd. in Moon 
104).  The impracticality of this aspect of Kim Il Sung’s purification policy proved to be 
problematic to the point that even his son and successor would openly acknowledge it 
and take actions to resolve it.  The process of eliminating the coined words continued and 
by 1992 only 12,000 of the 50,000 coined words remained.  
As Sim Pyeng-Ho points out, “This adjustment of lexical purism shows that many 
of the revised words had not been well accepted by the public, that it was much more 
difficult to change people’s linguistic habits than it was to revise words” (qtd. in Moon 
105).  Considering this reality, it is no real surprise that Kim Il Sung’s purification policy 
was drastically modified, if not reversed, by Kim Jong Il.  However, the second leader of 
North Korea was by no means against language planning.  Under Kim Jong Il, “the 
relationship between language and nation is more strongly emphasized as the single most 
important symbol of the nation than before” (Moon 103).  Juche, or self reliance, 
continued to govern the language planning process under Kim Jong Il, although the 
policy of purification was drastically scaled back.   
 Given the fact that his son took actions to modify Kim Il Sung’s language policy 
of purification, questions regarding the functions of the language policies arise.  If the 
policies were truly rooted in the goals of development and purification, they would have 
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been more linguistically sound from the beginning and would not have been drastically 
altered 20 years after implementation.  Although the policies may have had true linguistic 
functions, it is important, particularly in North Korea, to consider the performance aspect 
of Kim Il Sung’s speeches on language policy.   
 Kim Il Sung’s speeches were not based on logic; rather, he strives to appeal to the 
emotions of his audience.  In his 1964 speech, for example, Kim states:  
Our language is so rich that it is capable of expressing any complex 
thought or delicate feeling well, can stir people, make them laugh or cry.  
Our language is also effective in educating people in communist morality, 
because it can express matters of courtesy with precision.  Our national 
language is so rich in pronunciation that in it we can pronounce almost 
freely the sounds of any other language of the Eastern or Western 
countries. (Kim “Some Problems” 5)47  
 
Kim Il Sung’s description of Korean, other than the last sentence, is basically an accurate 
description of any fully developed language.  However, this description is meant to 
inspire pride in the Korean language specifically.   
Kim Il Sung also employs this strategy of stirring emotions when he rehashes the 
emotions connected to the Japanese colonization period, a time during which Koreans 
believe their language was suppressed.  He also continually criticizes the South for 
allowing English to infiltrate Korean.  He attempts to inspire a sense of worry that 
Korean is on its way out when he says, “if we take no action our language will really die 
                                                
 
 
47 “우리 말은 표현이 풍부하여 복잡한 사상과 섬제한 감정을 다 잘 나타낼수 
있으며 사람들을 격동시킬수 있고 울릴수도 있으며 웃길수도 있습니다. 우리 말은 
례의범절을 똑똑히 나타낼수 있기때문에 사람들의 공산주의도덕교양에도 매우 
좋습니다. 또 한 우리 나라 말음이 매우 풍부합니다. 그렇기때문에 우리 말과 
글로써는 동서양의 어떤 나라 말의 발음이든지 거의 마음대로 나타낼수 있습니다” 
(Kim “Chosŏnŏrŭl palchŏnsik’iki” 249-250). 
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out” (Kim “On Correctly Preserving” 286).48  By appealing to emotions, Kim Il Sung was 
successful in garnering the support of his audience of linguists.  The support was also 
likely given out of fear, considering Kim’s record of purging those who challenged his 
policies.  
Through his criticism of the South for being a puppet of the United States, he 
attempted to appeal to a sense of pride: pride in North Korea’s holding to Korean culture 
and the Korean language while the South was becoming ever-more westernized by the 
Yankees.  In his speeches to North Korean linguists, for example, Kim Il Sung 
exaggerated the linguistic situation in South Korea.  Since the American military had a 
presence in South Korea, Kim Il Sung promoted the idea that English was corrupting the 
Korean in the South.  This propaganda was only strengthened by the fact that General 
MacArthur had established English as the military’s official language: “in the event of 
any ambiguity or diversity of interpretation or definition between any English and Korean 
or Japanese text, the English text shall prevail” (General Douglas MacArthur’s first 
official communiqué, Proclamation No. 1, qtd. in King 112-113).  This temporary policy 
lasted throughout the US military ruling of South Korea from 1945 to 1948.  King stated, 
“Thus, technically speaking, English became the official language for a time, and this 
particular policy would feed into later North Korean attempts to build a myth of 
‘American imperialist policy to obliterate the Korean language’ in South Korea” (113).  
However, the policy was clearly not one established with the goal of assimilating 
Koreans to American culture by “obliterating” the Korean language.  Rather, it was 
                                                
 





established because American soldiers neither spoke nor understood Korean.49  As is the 
case today, it is safe to assume that at that time in history, there were more Koreans who 
spoke English than Americans who spoke Korean. 
In 1981, in the third issue of the journal Cultured Language Learning, in the 
article “After the Three Kingdoms Period, the Koguryo Language Played a Leading Role 
in the Development of Our Language” Kim Il Sung harped on the Japanese occupation 
and the threat that the Japanese placed on the Korean language.  In the fourth issue, Kim 
Il Sung implored the North Korean readers to “extend the struggle against the policy of 
national-language linguicide of American imperialism” (qtd. in King 131).  In Cultured 
Language Learning, a linguistic journal in North Korea, Kim Il Sung went so far as to 
say, “Through the policy of extermination of the Korean language of the American 
imperialists, our language [the Korean language] is gradually losing its purity and turning 
into a gibberish mixture” (qtd. in King 133).  It is unknown exactly how effective Kim Il 
Sung’s unfounded criticism of South Korea’s language situation was in building cultural 
nationalism in the North.  However, it is clear that Kim Il Sung believed it was necessary 
to continually spread this propaganda. 
  It is evident that Kim Il Sung’s declaration of a language purification policy was 
a method of proving to his people and South Korea that the North was stronger and more 
committed to their primordial ideals than South Korea.  Kim Il Sung’s tone suggests that 
linguistic purity and cultural purity is the most important aspect of being a nation.  He 
paints a picture of the South as a country that is no longer Korean.  In a society where 
                                                
 
 
49 It can also be argued that that the policy acted as a form of neocolonialism by 
the US over South Korea.   
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bloodline and identity is highly valued and considered, Kim Il Sung’s descriptions of the 
South are not light insults.   
Kim Il Sung also declared that the Korean used in the North was purer and 
stronger than the Korean used in the South because the Korean language originated in 
North Korea.   
North Korea has attempted to elaborate a myth of primordial northern 
primacy in the prehistory of the language.  The stress on the Koguryo 
language as the root of ancient Korean has been part of a larger North 
Korean myth that arose in reaction to the South Korean myth of an Altaic 
heritage for Korean.  This latter myth was attributed by the North to a U.S. 
reactionary conspiracy to persuade South Koreans that their language was 
somehow derived, second-rate, and not autochthonous and hence fit for 
outside control. (King 131)   
 
Kim Il Sung was essentially declaring that the South never had primordial claims to the 
language in the first place.  According to Kim, it was the lack of primordial linguistic 
roots that allowed the South to be culturally overtaken by the outside world.  This 
primordialist propaganda was Kim Il Sung’s method of inspiring cultural pride and 
nationalism and claiming cultural superiority on the peninsula.   
Kim Il Sung supported the North’s primordialist claims to the Korean language by 
referencing the victimization of the Korean language during the Japanese occupation.  
Considering the charged emotions on both sides of the peninsula relating to the Japanese 
linguistic assimilation efforts during the occupation period, the North’s claim that the 
South allowed the Korean language to become corrupted and once again subject to 
destruction was an insult to the core.  It marked the South as a cultural traitor to the 
Korean identity. 
The language policies of Kim Il Sung in 1960s North Korea were, unsurprisingly, 
unsustainable and therefore modified in the 1980s by Kim Jong Il.  However, the 
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successful purification of Korean in the North was never the true goal.  This policy 
created by Kim Il Sung was merely a weapon of nationalist propaganda against South 
Korea.  The economic aid from the US in the 1950s and 1960s and the normalized 
relations with Japan in 1965 symbolized South Korea’s alliance and continuing 
friendship with two of the richest countries in the world and North Korea’s enemies: US 
and Japan.  The North’s response was a personal attack aimed at something that both 
sides of the peninsula had fought to preserve during the Japanese occupation of 1910-
1945: the Korean language.  According to Kim Il Sung, this preservation effort had been 
discarded in the South.  The North’s propaganda machine produced an image of the 
South Korean language as littered with Chinese, Japanese, and, worst of all, English.  
According to this propaganda, although the South was benefiting lavishly from it 
relationship with the US and Japan, their language, and thus their cultural identity, was 
falling apart.  The North propagated this idea and supported it through language policies.  
These policies furthered the ideology of juche and nationalism in the North by purporting 
that their language was on a path to purity while the language in South Korea was an 
ever-corrupt polyglot language destined for cultural destruction.  Promoting this idea of 
linguistic purity was a means by which Kim Il Sung could establish cultural superiority 
over South Korea at a time when that country’s relationship with the US and Japan 







The periods of suppression of the Korean language during the Japanese 
occupation, from 1910 to 1945, inspired a drive to protect the language on the peninsula.  
The Japanese colonizers suppressed the Korean language to various degrees throughout 
their 35-year rule.  Japanese language education in schools became a strong focus of the 
assimilation effort toward the end of the colonization period.  In the final years of the 
occupation, Korean language education was not permitted in schools.  Korean media and 
entertainment was censored and, at times, banned entirely.  On two separate occasions, 
the public usage of Korean was prohibited.  The linguistic oppression extended even to 
names.  Koreans were required to “Japanize” their names, further suppressing their 
Korean identity. 
These events were still fresh in the minds of many North Koreans after liberation, 
at which time the North formed language policies to eradicate illiteracy and remove 
Chinese characters from the Korean script.   These postliberation policies seemed to be 
formed and carried out by Kim Il Sung in conjunction with North Korean linguists.  In 
1964, in the spirit of juche, which had by this time taken full root in North Korea, Kim Il 
Sung took full control of linguistic issues and established his extreme language policy.  
Kim Il Sung’s language policy in the 1960s was a means by which Kim could carry the 
juche ideology to the people and unify them in a sense of cultural and linguistic purity 
and superiority over South Korea.  The drive to protect Korean in the hearts of the people 
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allowed his extreme policies, created with the expressed goal of purifying and developing 
Korean, to be implemented vigorously until his son became the leader, at which point 
they were scaled back.  Kim Il Sung played to his audience’s emotions surrounding the 
need to protect Korean from becoming corrupt as, he purported, it had in the South.  He 
presented his plans to purify the Korean language in his 1964 and 1966 speeches to North 
Korean linguists.   
Kim Il Sung’s first speech in 1964, “Some Problems Related to the Development 
of the Korean Language,” served the purpose of introducing the language issues in 
question.  Although letter reform, word spacing, and Korean language education were all 
briefly addressed, Kim Il Sung emphasized a purification policy calling for the 
replacement of all Chinese loanwords with pure Korean words.  Kim Il Sung also used 
this opportunity to inspire a sense of pride in the language by praising Korean’s ability to 
fully communicate expressions and ideas, characteristics of any fully developed 
language.   
Kim Il Sung touched on many of the same policies in his 1966 speech to linguists, 
but more emphasis still was placed on the purification policy.  In this speech, Kim Il 
Sung proposed his plans for implementing the extreme purification policy.  The policy 
would be seen in nearly every facet of society: children would be educated on the newly 
coined and pure Korean words, textbooks with Chinese characters would be replaced, 
newspapers would carry new word lists, new dictionaries would be printed, and children 
would correct the older generation that would undoubtedly continue to use Chinese words 
out of habit. 
In the early and mid 1960s, South Korea’s interaction with the United States 
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continued to be strong and its relationship with Japan had normalized.  Although aid from 
the US in the 1960s was generally lower than in the 1950s, the US seemed to increase its 
interaction with the South at this time to help it reach President Park’s economic goals.  
The South’s improving relationship with Japan is evidenced by the economic aid from 
Japan after the South normalized relations with the former colonizer.  
Kim Il Sung would have viewed these relationships as a betrayal to the North and 
a desertion of Korean culture.  The speeches in 1964 and 1966 reflected Kim Il Sung’s 
increasing drive to be self-reliant in all areas to fully embrace juche ideology.  
Establishing his purification policy was Kim’s method of implementing juche on a 
linguistic level to unite the people in cultural and linguistic purity and to assert North 
Korea’s cultural superiority in reaction to the South’s positive relationships with the US 
and Japan.   
This argument that Kim Il Sung’s speeches on language policy were more a 
performance of cultural superiority than a realistic plan to be implemented is furthered by 
the fact that Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung’s son and successor, drastically altered the 
purification policy.  Under his rule, of the 50,000 words that had been coined since the 
purification policy’s establishment, only 12,000 remained by 1992.  Kim Il Sung’s 
language policy was perhaps never meant to succeed because its success in actual 
implementation was not the goal.   
The goal was to further implement juche and, in so doing, establish cultural 
superiority over the South.  Kim Il Sung’s criticisms of the South’s language situation are 
scattered throughout his speeches.  Kim Il Sung labeled the South’s language as a 
“polyglot” language that uses little more than loanwords from Chinese, Japanese, and 
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English.  These criticisms of the South coupled with Kim Il Sung’s remarks regarding the 
Japanese colonizers’ suppression of Korean were meant to rekindle the drive to protect 
the Korean language and to keep it from deteriorating, as he claims that it had in the 
South.  Yet, as this paper shows, the implementation of the policy proved to be 
impractical and the policy functioned, instead, as a means for the North to appear 
culturally superior to the cultural traitors in the South.  
This analysis of North Korea’s language policy fits into a larger narrative of how 
to effectively understand North Korea.  In analyzing Kim Il Sung’s language policy in 
isolation, it is natural to arrive at the commonly held conclusion that much of what is 
done in North Korea is strange and irrational.  However, when Kim Il Sung’s language 
policy is analyzed in the context of juche and competition with South Korea, we begin to 
more fully understand the reasons for the speeches and the implausible purification 
policy.   
 In analyzing North Korea, it is important to remember that actions in the North, 
though they may appear insensible, have reasons.  As I mentioned in the introduction of 
this paper, events in North Korea are often reactions to situations in the South.  The North 
has been in competition with the South since the division of the peninsula, and I believe 
that analyzing the North with this perspective can be useful not only in the analysis of 
Kim Il Sung’s language policy but also in other areas.  
 
Future Research 
 As is the case with research related to North Korea, information is limited and any 
articles or documents that can be obtained from the country come with questionable 
integrity.  It is hard to trust anything that has gone through the North Korean filters 
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before being published for the world.  I believe further research on North Korean 
language policy would benefit from interviewing North Korean refugees who were living 
in North Korea during the 1960s and 1970s, when the purification policy was in full 
effect.  Through interviewing North Korean refugees, the extent to which the purification 
policy was implemented in schools, textbooks, newspapers, and other areas of society 
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